Priming Partisanship: How Activating Partisan Identity Affects Survey Responses.
The integrity of survey data is key in political science research and public political efficacy. Using theories of partisan identity I hypothesize that asking survey respondents about their partisanship leanings early in surveys can compromise their answers. I ran an experiment changing the point at which I asked partisan questions, and then examined the variance of the answers of the respondents. The results show evidence for my hypothesis: survey respondents were more likely to answer in a more extreme partisan fashion when they were primed by asking about their partisanship affiliation at the beginning of the survey. This finding is important to the study of the relationship between partisanship and ideology, and is vital for both survey research and the transmission of accurate information from the public to elected leaders, particularly in times of high polarization.
Interbranch Warfare: Senate Amending Process and Restrictive House Rules. With Anthony J Madonna, Ryan D Williamson, Laine P Shay, and Jordan McKissick.
In this paper, we examine the increase in proposed floor amendments in the Senate. We argue that, in addition to an increased value from electoral position-taking, the procedures employed in the House of Representatives influence the floor behavior of senators. Specifically, after controlling for issue content, we find that senators are more likely to offer amendments to bills that were passed under a restrictive rule in the House as opposed to those passed under an open rule. We do so by comparing amending behavior in the U.S. Senate to that of the House under both open and closed rules using a newly constructed dataset of all amendments to landmark legislation from 1901 to 2012.
President No: Congressional Responses to Veto Threats From The Executive.
What does Congress do when the president threatens to veto a bill? Despite Cameron’s work on presidential vetoes, political science has not fully examined the relationship be- tween the president and Congress when it comes to veto bargaining, because most work up to now has focused on bills that have been vetoed, which is only a portion of the process. In this study I examine congressional behavior when a veto threat has been made. I find that Congress amends legislation to better suit the president when a constructive veto threat has been made, although the effect is quite small.